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Abstract

Litigation

Businesses that launch new products or services generally
understand the risk of suits for patent infringement from
SEARCH

competitors and other patent holders. Such risks are
>>

especially high when the first business (“challenger,”) holds
no patents on the product or service. However,
commercializers that do have patents or patent applications

Shidler Center
UW School of Law

covering their new product or service may be less aware of
another lurking risk: a competitor or other party
(“challenger,”) owning a separate patent application. In such
a scenario, a challenger may provoke a patent interference
proceeding to challenge the date of invention for the
commercializer’s patent or patent application. This Article
explores these potential scenarios and analyzes limitations
to a challenger’s ability to aggressively provoke an
interference proceeding.
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INTRODUCTION
Companies that seek to patent and commercialize a particular
invention (“commercializers”) will encounter several risks during
the patent application process. The most common risk is patent
infringement, which involves an analysis of whether an existing
patent owner’s patent claims read on or cover the
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commercializer’s product. However, a frequent and less
understood risk relates to situations where a different patent
applicant, or “challenger,” provokes an “interference” proceeding
under 35 U.S.C. § 135. In some instances, such an effort may
appear to “steal” the exclusive rights to a new product or
service being brought to market by a commercializer, by
modifying an earlier application to include matters covered by
the latter’s application. From the commercializer’s perspective,
the challenger simply waits to see the new product or service
and then effectively amends its patent application to read on
the new product or service.
However, commercializers can take heart in the fact that the
patent laws do not generally allow this gambit. Instead, the
challenger has to argue that its application actually reads on the
new product or service from its first date of filing, if it seeks to
use that date of filing as the “priority” date showing its
possession and enablement of the invention. Thus, the
requirements of an adequate “written description” and
“enablement,” as set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112, can act as an
effective hedge against unscrupulous challengers who try to
provoke an unjustified interference.
In addition, future limitations may result as Congress moves
towards harmonizing the U.S. patent system with global
standards. Future legislation could transition the United States
from its current unique “first-to-invent” patent system to the
more common “first-to-file” system, which is employed by most
other developed countries and eliminates interference
proceedings altogether.2 In the absence of new legislation,
however, companies and their counsel should be aware of the
potential threat surrounding the use of interference practice to
acquire rights to a competitor’s later developed technology.3 In
light of these current issues and developments, this Article will
address the unique aspects of a first-to-invent system, briefly
describe interference proceedings, and discuss the current state
of case law regarding written description requirements for
patent interferences. Finally, this Article will discuss recent
developments with future legislation from Congress.

FIRST-TO-INVENT AND INTERFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
The first-to-invent approach for determining priority of invention
is unique to the United States. 4 A first-to-invent system
rewards the first true inventor that conceives of the invention
and diligently reduces it to practice, regardless of whether the
inventor was the first to file a patent. In contrast, the first-tofile system confers patent rights to the first inventor to file an
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application. To some in the patent community, the first-toinvent system more effectively encourages innovation. Critics of
a first-to-file system argue that a company with vast resources
will likely win any “race” to the patent office for most
inventions.5 Therefore, according to first-to-invent supporters,
the first-to-invent system should protect the small, independent
garage inventor, who may not have the resources to rush to file
a patent.6 The small inventor can prevail over larger, more
patent-savvy companies. Whether or not this approach actually
enhances innovation is open to debate, but it is one that will
likely continue as global harmonization continues to play itself
out.
Despite pending changes, the current patent code grants
protection to a first inventor by establishing the concept of
interference proceedings. 7 In practice, patent interferences are
procedurally and substantively complex. A patent interference
involves a comparison of the claims in one pending patent
application, with the claims in another pending application or
previously issued patent. Interferences can result by mere
chance, for example, when two (or more) applicants
independently invent the same technology. Indeed, during
examination, a patent examiner may find that two sets of claims
in separate applications substantially overlap; accordingly, the
examiner can suggest an interference. 8 In the alternative (and
as highlighted within this Article), challengers can purposefully
provoke interferences by amending claims in a pending
application to cover another commercializer’s identical subject
matter.
One method used to provoke an interference includes copying
the exact terms of the claims presented in a commercializer’s
issued patent, or otherwise pending application. In some cases,
however, identical claim language fails to guarantee that two
inventions are, in fact, the same inventions or patentably
indistinct.9 In each application, each specification may define or
limit the claims differently through explicit or implicit
language. 10 Thus, to provoke an interference with a second
application, a challenger may have to draft claims that are not
identical to, but still cover, the commercializer’s claimed
invention. This latter “overlap” strategy can be particularly useful
when a challenger’s patent specification needs to sufficiently
describe and enable the new claims containing the exact terms
of a commercializer’s claims.
Once a challenger presents claims that provoke an interference,
the USPTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“the
Board”) defines the interfering subject matter through what is
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called a “count.”11 In particular, the Board analyzes facts and
data representing when each party invented the subject matter
within the scope of a particular count. In most interferences, the
party that filed first (the senior party) will be challenged by a
later filing party (the junior party), who believes she invented
first. 12 An inventor can prove priority of invention by showing:
(1) conception, and (2) diligent reduction to practice, the
invention in a workable or patentable form. 13 An inventor
establishes conception when he describes his invention so as “to
enable one skilled in the art to reduce it to practice without the
exercise of extensive experimentation or the exercise of
inventive skill.”14
Moreover, the first inventor that conceives of the invention must
also show reasonable diligence in working towards reducing the
invention to practice. 15 Generally, reduction to practice can be
described as making the invention workable, which is an actual
reduction to practice, or filing a patent application, which is a
constructive reduction to practice. 16 The process of proving the
necessary substantive elements is intensive, and both parties
will rely heavily on in-depth analysis of inventor records,
drawings, and notebooks. 17
While inventor records are vital to winning an interference, a
challenger’s case may instead hinge on whether its patent
application adequately supports the claims in the count that
encompasses a commercializer’s product or device. The
subsequent discussion addresses this potential issue in light of
recent cases on written description and enablement in the
context of patent interferences.

LIMITS ON WRITTEN DESCRIPTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 112
The federal patent code and the common law dictate the
requirements for patentability. For example, 35 U.S.C. § 112
states that a patent’s “specification shall contain a written
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . .
. to make and use the same.”18 This is otherwise known as the
written description and enablement requirements.19 Stated
another way, the patent must be written such that a person
having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”) can practice the
invention based solely on this written disclosure in the
application, any included drawings, and the presumed average
background knowledge and skill.
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In the context of patent interferences, written description can
serve its traditional function for “policing priority and to prevent
applicants from claiming ‘new matter.’” 20 For example, a patent
that describes X cannot be used to claim some new element, Y,
which could be a competitor’s later novel invention. However,
there may be no clear boundary on what the patent describes
or adds as new matter in newly filed claims used to provoke an
interference. This lack of clarity requires significant costs and
time for a company to determine whether the invoking party
has a plausible claim. With each of these possibilities, however,
written description may be a strength or liability. Depending on
the types of technology, the standard required to satisfy written
description can vary. Recent appeals on interferences decided by
the Federal Circuit have tended to limit an inventor’s ability to
expand claims past the scope of the specification. Thus, invoking
interference proceedings appears to have become increasingly
difficult or, at least, more unpredictable.
For example, in Mukherjee v. May-Ying Chu, the Federal Circuit
held that the patentee’s application did not support the claimed
subject matter in the count.21 As presented in the application,
the technology at issue related to batteries that contained an
Electroactive Transition Metal Chalcogenide (“ETMC”)
composition. 22 In the interference, however, the patentee was
attempting to cover a competitor’s invention relating to nonETMC batteries. 23 The court concluded that the patentee’s
written description did not “support the broad cathode limitation
recited in Mukherjee’s claims because the disclosure of the
application is limited to cathodes that contain ETMC.”24 In other
words, a challenger’s claim may be vulnerable to a written
description argument if it attempts to cover a scope that does
not include a feature essential for its patentability.
In contrast, the Federal Circuit in Falkner v. Inglis affirmed the
Board’s finding that the senior party Inglis’ specification
adequately described the vaccine for poxvirus, even though it
did not disclose “essential regions” of any poxvirus. 25 The court
specifically reiterated that examples or actual reduction to
practice were not required for adequate description, and that
“there is no per se rule that an adequate written description of
an invention that involves a biological macromolecule must
contain a recitation of known structure [i.e., the essential
regions].” 26
The Falkner ruling is particularly curious in light of Regents of
the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., in which the court
held a patent invalid for not adequately describing a DNA
invention.27 The application in that case did not include a
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“structure, formula, chemical name, or [description of] physical
properties.”28 For the Falkner Court, however, the prior art
already included the allegedly “essential regions,” and the court
was able to distinguish this fact to conclude that Eli Lilly was
not binding. 29
Additional uncertainties may be also due to the general flux of
the written description doctrine. As highlighted in Judge Rader’s
dissent in LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., the
“court has [been] search[ing] for a proper standard for its
revised and evolving written description doctrine.”30 In
LizardTech, the patent covered methods for storing and
retrieving digital images using discrete wavelet transform
(“DWT”)-based compression.31 The panel’s decision ruled that
some of the claims invalid for failing to provide adequate written
description. 32 It is unclear, however, whether the court’s
applied standard intertwined enablement and written description
together, which, in the past, have been distinct requirements.33
Such lack of clarity may affect the risk equation for challengers
and commercializers alike when dealing with interference
proceedings.
Also, for patent interferences, the level of risk for each party
may depend on the predictability of the technological art at
issue. Another case, Capon v. Eshhar, suggests that written
description may be different for each field of technology: the
laws “application will vary with differences in the state of
knowledge in the field and differences in the predictability of the
science.” 34 In the mechanical arts, outcomes are more
predictable than outcomes in biotechnology. For example, if an
inventor wants to make a mechanical part with a protrusion that
extends at an angle, the piece can be manufactured relatively
easily. However, if a scientist wants to make a particular
modification to a biological compound, the results of the
modification may be unpredictable and can depend on less
certain natural forces. Thus, written description requirements for
biotechnology inventions may be stricter than those of the
mechanical arts because the patent may not clearly account for
unpredictability. If a biotechnological feature is missing from the
later filed application, then written description support is less
likely due to less predictability in the art.
A review of the recent case law on written description with
respect to interferences in particular, as well as other cases,
suggests that the Federal Circuit may be limiting a patentee’s
ability to expand the scope of interference proceedings in most
instances. However, uncertainties exist as the written description
doctrine continues to evolve. Counsel should address these
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considerations when discussing the scope of possible
interference claims.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In addition to judicial limitations on interference claims,
Congress has proposed changes to the patent system that
would not only limit, but effectively wipeout interference practice
altogether. In March 2009, three bills were introduced and are
currently being considered in both the House and Senate. Each
bill presents drastic changes that will likely have a profound
influence on the U.S. patent system. 35 One of the biggest
relevant changes is a proposed move to the first-to-file
approach. Such implications are beyond the scope of this
article; 36 however, years of pending applications would likely
still fall under the previous first-to-invent system. Practitioners
will need to be aware of issues in interference practice during
the coming years, even if the United States shifts to a first-tofile system.

CONCLUSION
As with infringement claims, innovative companies must also
face the risk of competitors invoking interference proceedings to
acquire exclusive rights to a later developed and better
technology. Currently, adequate written descriptions present a
potential weakness in many competitors’ strategies, and should
be considered in such circumstances. Recent legislative
developments offer certain new limits to these claims, but have
yet to go into effect. Counsel should account for such risks when
managing patent portfolios and discussing strategies on how to
proceed against a competitor’s provoked interference.
<< Top
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